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Purpose Statement 
Through the College Scholars program, I have designed my collegiate studies 
around languages, history, and political science to create a concentration ofInternational 
Studies. For the most part, my studies typically centered on European affairs until a few 
months ago when I received my Peace Corps assignment to Honduras. I was excited, but 
also a little nervous about my lack of knowledge of Central America. I received a folder 
on Honduras with basic statistics and pertinent information, like a packing list. As I 
looked over it, I was struck by the repeated warnings against any military or camouflage 
clothing. Ever curious, I began preliminary research on the military in my soon-to-be 
home. In Honduran literature, I discovered several references to animosity towards North 
Americans pertaining to government and military affairs. Of course, this information 
ignited my desire to explore United States policy towards Honduras on a greater scale. 
My research begins in 1981, the year that an electoral democracy returned to 
Honduras and President Reagan entered office. My goal in this paper is to educate 
myself on the history of United States intervention into Honduran affairs, while taking an 
analytical approach in examining the Reagan and Clinton policies. After my research, I 
now have a better understanding of this complex relationship. With my conclusions, I 
hope to turn fa pUla, or "the whore" of the United States, as Honduras was called in the 
1980's, into una amiga in the new millennium with the creation of an ideal policy. 
Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, two important stories in the international arena are the 
end of the Cold War and the transformation of developing nations -- both of which help 
define this paper. American foreign relations with Honduras have fluctuated greatly, 
depending on world circumstances and strategic games, and this paper focuses on the 
foreign policy period from 1981 to present day. In 1981, Honduras returned to 
democratic rule with free elections, coinciding with the commencement of the Reagan 
administration in the United States. 
Foreign aid consists of military or economic assistance that one country gives to 
help another. Since it varies in form, encompassing donations of money, goods, services, 
and technical knowledge, it can be difficult to calculate an exact amount. Countries 
extend foreign aid for humanitarian reasons and, more often, to advance their own 
foreign policy objectives. 
Securing funding from Congress for foreign aid has been a growing problem for 
several reasons, including lack of public support. Surveys taken in recent years generally 
revealed that less than half the American public supported foreign aid and a smaller 
percentage supported selling military weapons and equipment abroad. Public perception 
is that the United States spends more on foreign aid than in reality [see Appendix A]. For 
example, at least half of the respondents to a 1995 survey thought that 15 percent of the 
federal budget went to foreign aid, although the actual level at the time was 
approximately one percent. In reality, the United States actually gives the equivalent of 
one quarter of one percent of the gross domestic product in foreign aid.! 
I Peter Slevin, "A Fall From Grace; Foreign Aid Spending Continues to Decline, Much to the Dismay of 
those who Fear a Loss of U.S. Influence Abroad," Tampa Tribune (27 April 1996), 6W. 
2 
Honduras is an independent country, small in size and importance to the United 
States. Within its region of Central America, it retains the lowest gross domestic product 
of $81 0, yet boasts the second largest population, creating serious social and economic 
problems for this tiny nation.2 Honduras is located on the isthmus of Central America, 
located between Guatemala and Nicaragua, directly south of New Orleans across the Gulf 
of Mexico [See Appendix B]. 
Over time, relations between the United States and Honduras have ranged from 
strong to weak, stemming back to early colonial times. Typically, the United States 
addresses Central American concerns and policies with one blanket foreign policy, except 
in extreme situations. In this project, the Honduran and Central American policies are 
interchangeable, except where specifically noted. 
2 "Honduras Country Notes," U. S. Department of State, 
<http://www.state.gov/wwwlbackground_noteslhonduras_l099 _ bgn.html>, (Oct. 1999). 
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History of foreign intervention and world events 
Stemming back to the era of Spanish colonization, Honduras' experience of 
external intervention into its domestic affairs and foreign policy creates an unfortunate 
cycle. In 1823, President James Momoe proclaimed the role of the United States in 
regard to protecting the Western Hemisphere from European interests with the Monroe 
Doctrine. With this proclamation, the United States ushered in an era of surveillance 
over Honduras and Central America. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 
1904 formally created an asymmetrical bilateral obligation by the United States to serve 
as the "international police power" in the hemisphere.3 In 1907, the Taft administration 
took over control of the $120 million Honduran debt structure from the United Kingdom, 
exchanging British influence and control for United States.4 In essence, Honduras 
became a protectorate, as the United States supported and insured Honduran efforts to 
remain independent throughout the following decades. 
The watchful eye of the United Stated continued into the 20th century with the 
heavy-handed gunboat diplomacy by President Teddy Roosevelt, Jr. While a full scale 
Marine invasion of Honduras never occurred, the Good Neighbor Policy of President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's was a welcome change from the "overweening sense of 
paternalistic self-righteousness" of the big stick diplomatic methods.5 
The defeat of the Axis powers in World War II led to the fall of the iron curtain 
across the globe, with the United States diametrically opposing the Soviet Union. States 
and nations around the globe scurried to align themselves with one of the two world 
3 Albert Fishlow and James Jones,eds., The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First Century View, 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999) 17. 
4 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolution: The United States in Central America, (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1993),39. 
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powers. The United States was quick to assert itself with the Truman Doctrine in 1947. 
Projecting the message of the Monroe Doctrine on a global scale, President Harry 
Truman announced his intent to provide military and economic assistance to any nation 
that felt threatened by communism. 
While most nations in Central America remained in the hands of the United 
States, a few countries, like Cuba, strayed to the Soviets. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 
and the rise of Fidel Castro made the United States uneasy, as the communist ideology 
surfaced in the Western Hemisphere. In an attempt to reassert American and capitalist 
prominence, the United States concocted the Bay of Pigs scheme. This disastrous 
incident in Cuba in April 1961 led to an embarrassing defeat by Castro over mismanaged 
American troops, resulting in increased tensions between the two American and Soviet 
superpowers.6 In October of 1962 the severity ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis revealed the 
thin red line separating the tense superpowers. 
With the assassination of President Kennedy and onset of American involvement 
in Vietnam, the failing Latin American program, Alliance for Progress, came to an end.7 
Serving as the preeminent influence in the Western Hemisphere, a hegemonic 
relationship was the cornerstone of United States' foreign policy for Central America. 
Spanning almost twenty years, the lengthy Vietnam War finally drew to a close in 
1975, following the defeat of the American-backed South Vietnam troops. What began 
as an earnest effort to fight the communist North Vietnamese Army ended in a bloody 
mess. This armed conflict noisily divided the American public, giving rise to term, 
5 Donald Schulz and Deborah Schulz, The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America, 
(Boulder, CO: Westveiw Press, 1994), 16. 
6 Kenneth Coleman and George Herring, Understanding the Central American Crisis- Sources of Conflict. 
U.S. Policy, and Options for Peace, (Wilmington, DE: Scholar Resources, Inc., 1991), 159. 
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Vietnam syndrome. American Presidents following Vietnam continually had to answer 
to the American public for foreign military involvement with a quick and direct win when 
committing American troops. 
Carter and his soft foreign policy 
With numerous foreign policy disasters, President Carter entered the 1980 
election with a noose tightening around his neck. Major foreign policy disasters during 
his administration included the Iranian hostage situation and Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan, which killed Carter's efforts to ratify SALT II arms control, as gas prices 
also rose sharply in 1979.8 He was credited with giving away the Panama Canal. Many 
of the problems were beyond his control, but America's strong public reaction against 
Carter revealed increasing apprehension. The principal criticism Carter faced was not 
being tough enough toward the Russians. His policy focused on diplomatic negotiations 
and humanitarianism while Ronald Reagan, a media darling in the upcoming presidential 
elections, focused on stronger tactics in dealing with the Soviet Union. 
Origins of tbe Central American crisis 
A major event occurred in mid-1979 that dramatically altered relations with 
Central America. In July, the rule of the Somoza dynasty of Nicaragua ended as the 
revolution arrived in Central America and the Sandinista National Liberation Front rose 
to power. Guerilla activity contributed to eminent civil wars in Guatemala and EI 
7 Ibid, 28. 
8 Schulz and Schulz, The United States. Honduras. and the Crisis in Central America, 57 
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Salvador.9 With its history of foreign intervention and influence, the United States 
became increasingly worried about Honduras, as it was geographically located between 
the two troubled states. It was also important to the United States that another country 
not fall into the hands of Marxist rule. Riding on this issue, Ronald Reagan took the 
Presidency. 
Prior to the revolution in Nicaragua, the United States policy towards Honduras 
and Central America can best be described as uninformed and unimportant due to more 
pressing issues in the international arena. Central America was mainly thought of as 
containing "derivative areas," important only when the Cold war extended to its land. 10 
Hondurans' behavior during the 1980's followed a precedent of political culture 
and history, set back in the colonial era. In the face of growing danger, the Honduran 
leaders turned to its foreign protector -- the United States. Lacking a strong sense of 
national pride and sovereignty and traditionally susceptible to bribery, they opened up the 
country to massive North American economic, political, military, and cultural 
penetration. This penetration and abuse of power indicates why Honduras received the 
nickname la puta ofthe United States. In the 1980's, unparalleled amounts of economic 
aid and military support would flood Honduras. In the process, Honduras tended to 
overlook the fact that its and United States' interests, while similar, were not identical. 
Reagan replaced Carter's "carrot" with a big stick 
The Reagan administration came to power in 1981 with a preconceived doctrine 
that defined the Central American crisis primarily in Cold War terms which called for 
9 Cynthia Amson, Crossroads: Congress. the President, and Central America, (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993),35. 
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military solutions. Furthermore, President Reagan was determined not to repeat Carter's 
accommodating foreign policy that proved to be a failure. One of his major goals was to 
create ideological consistency by developing conceptual and policy-oriented statements 
like the Santa Fe report, Caribbean Basin Initiative, Kissinger Communist Study and the 
Reagan Doctrine. 11 
From containment to roll-back, Reagan's foreign policies focused exclusively on 
political and strategic gains for the United States, usually put into action via the military. 
His first and foremost policy goal was the urgent desire to stop the spread of communism, 
especially within the Western Hemisphere, as emphasized by the Santa Fe paper. 12 At 
the heart of his policy, Reagan deliberately wanted to make an example out of Central 
America and emphasize the United State's power to the world, especially following 
Carter's weak foreign policy. 
With this realist perspective, Reagan and his administration viewed the 
developing world as little more than a stage for East-West conflict. The anti-Soviet 
strategy replaced all efforts to deal with revolutions and problems in the third world as a 
local problem. This adopted approach ignored the deep-seated national roots of unrest 
and, instead dealt with the crisis as a part of the strategic confrontation between the two 
world powers. 
Reagan's initial policy in Central America differed from Carter's in four 
significant ways. It incorporated a global position, rejected peaceful negotiating with the 
10 Wiarda, u.s. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era. 2. 
11 Dario Moreno, U.S. Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate, (Miami: Florida International 
University Press, 1990),82. 
12 Harold Molineau, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism. (Boulder, co: 
Westview Press, 1990), 195. 
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left, relied heavily on American military power, and de-emphasized the importance of 
human rights. 13 
Instead of soft tactics, Reagan's policy emphasized restoring United States' 
hegemony in the Central American region, incorporating United States military power, 
strengthening security assistance to the region, and augmenting support for pro-United 
States regimes despite their human rights history. 14 
Overall, the administration ignored economic and social policy in light of more 
pressing military and political concerns. One Pentagon official commented that 
"economic and social reforms are impossible unless you have political stability," 
revealing the thinking behind the lack of strong socio-economic support. IS 
United States' policy towards Honduras during the administration of Reagan was 
dualistic in nature. On one hand, they directed the country to continued rule of a 
democracy, reinforced the country's military strength, and prevented economic collapse. 
On the other hand, such policies undermined the shaky democracy and weakened 
economic development and national security. The restoration of an electoral democracy 
was accompanied by serious human rights violations. The massive build-up of armed 
forces would undermine civilian leaders by ensuring that national security policy would 
remain in the military's hands. The perpetuation of the war in EI Salvador and the onset 
of a new conflict in Nicaragua would make it impossible to attain the regional stability 
required for socioeconomic development. Meanwhile, the Honduran economy 
deteriorated as unemployment and homelessness grew, and the presence of the 
13 Moreno, U.S. Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate, 93-95. 
14 Ibid., 86. 
15 Ibid., 93. 
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Nicaraguan Contra army on Honduran soil raised serious issues of internal sovereignty, 
human rights, and possible conflict with Nicaragua. 16 
Reagan felt that the Nicaraguan problem would be quickly resolved by discarding 
the Carter policy of containment. In his plan, Honduras would become a launching pad 
to overthrow the Managua government through the creation of the Nicaraguan 
Counterrevolutionary Army while discreetly hosting the Contras within Honduras. The 
United States and the Central Intelligence Agency committed to fighting the covert war 
against the Sandinistas on the condition that the United States was in charge. 
The United States used its seemingly endless supply of economic and military 
resources to manipulate the Honduran government and armed forces to concede to 
Washington's way. With Honduras' traditional vulnerability for bribery, the Reagan 
administration used enormous material incentives to obtain cooperation. In 1982, more 
military aid and sales were transacted in Honduras than in all the years from 1946 to 
1980. Between 1980 and 1984, military aid increased almost twentyfold from $4 million 
to $78.5 million, with economic aid more than tripling to $168.7 million. 17 This influx 
of dollars strengthened the Honduran forces, kept the economy from collapsing, and 
provided ample opportunities for corruption. In 1985, aid for Honduras peaked with $57 
million in military support and $0.3 million in other aid categories. 18 
With the intensification of violence and public anxiety over the Central 
Intelligence Agency support for the Contras, the American public became increasingly 
concerned with the legality of suspicious activities within Central America. While 
16 Schulz and Schulz, The United States. Honduras. and the Crisis in Central American. 54. 
17 Ibid, 73. 
18 Tracy Wilkinson, "A Legacy of Conflict, Confusion; in the '80s, the U.S. Spent Billions to Aid Central 
America," Los Angeles Times. (17 Oct. 1993), 1A. 
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Congress cut off all further funding and prohibited United States personnel from aiding 
the Contras, the 1987 Iran-Contra hearings revealed the reluctance within the executive 
branch to adhere to this order. 19 Peace talks between Central American leaders and the 
United States extended over seven years. As Reagan's presidential term came to an end, 
Congress repeatedly refused to sign contra aid packages, so Central American leaders 
took matters in their own hands by signing an initial cease fire in 1988.20 With 
economies in Central America sagging, the Sandinistas were finally defeated politically 
in the 1990 presidential election in Nicaragua, signaling the end of the war in Nicaragua 
and the hosting ofContras by Honduras.21 
In a country of traditionally weak civilian rule, the American-supported strong 
Honduran military had ample opportunity to commit human rights abuses. In the 
Honduran city of Choluteca on the Pacific coast, EI Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, and 
Honduran leftists, detained under the suspicion of gunrunning, simply disappeared. 
Between 1981 and 1984, scores of people were assassinated or "disappeared" for political 
reasons.22 With the blessing of the Reagan administration, the genial corruption of 
Honduran military politics was transformed into something far more ominous. 
In 1984, Reagan proposed the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act in 
response to a call for a long-term policy towards Honduras. It was intended to fight the 
enormous trade deficit in the region, resulting from the influx of so much foreign aid 
19 Coleman and Herring, Understanding the Central American Crisis: Sources of Conflict. U.S. Policy. and 
Options for Peace, 205. 
20 Arson, Crossroads: Congress. the President. and Central America, 224-225 
21 LeFebre, Inevitable Revolutions, 352-353. 
22 Schulz and Schulz, The United States. Honduras. and the Crisis in Central American. 69. 
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from the United States?3 The purpose of the act was to expedite the economic 
development and export diversification of the Caribbean Basin economies. Also called 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, this economic policy netted minor positive gains in 1986, 
despite some restrictive features. 24 
One of the few successful policy items was beginning tenative democratic rule 
within Central America. However, true democratic institutions are still missing in 
Honduras. Today, an efficient judicial system with basic accountability is absent, despite 
the billions of United States dollars spent to promote them. United States officials now 
acknowledge that as long as Hondurans obeyed American demands regarding the Contras 
and military ventures, no questions were asked about where the money went. 25 With that 
kind of blind support, few Hondurans dared to challenge the military backed by Reagan, 
even as it abused its privileges. 
According to the United States Department of State, another successful foreign 
policy tool is a distant relative of the American government, the Peace Corps program. 
This was an especially important grass-roots social tool, contrasting with the harsh 
military policies of Reagan's administration. The volunteers were American citizens who 
work directly with the Honduran people to educate them on social issues concerning 
health, education, agriculture, and business.26 
Overall, the United States' policy focused more on keeping a lid on the pressure 
cooker than addressing the cause of problems. The push to militarize the country 
23 Nancy Peckenham and Annie Street, Honduras: A Portrait of A Captured Nation. (New York: CBS 
Educational And Professional Publishing, 1985), 246. 
24 Leonard, Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability, 187. 
25 Wilkinson, "A Legacy ofConfiict, Confusion; in the '80s, the U.S. Spent Billions to Aid Central 
America," 1A. 
26 "Honduras Country Notes," <http://www.state.goy/www/background_noteslhonduras_1099 _ bgn.htrnl>. 
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strengthened the very forces that most threatened democracy and wasted scarce monetary 
resources that would have been better invested in economic development. 
In the end, the Reagan administration became so fixated on the communist enemy 
that it was blinded to the destructive impact of its policies on Honduras. Honduras was 
reduced largely to an instrument of United States policy, valued not so much for itself as 
for its usefulness in the crusade against the Sandinistas. The consequence of this policy 
was that the administration's Honduran policy became increasingly counterproductive; a 
strategy intended to bolster the country's stability had precisely the opposite effect.27 
Bush Years, a hiatus in Honduran relations 
The transition of power from Reagan to George Bush in 1989 was a minor 
precursor to an approaching global transformation of power and politics. With the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in late 1989, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact, it was time for the United States to rethink foreign policy and assumptions 
held since 1946. The shift from a strategic threat-oriented policy to an opportunity-based 
policy would take time to understand and incorporate. 
Almost immediately after his election, President Bush focused on getting re-
elected and neglected maintaining foreign relations in this newly unipolar international 
community. In general, Bush largely ignored all foreign actors, with the exception of the 
changing Soviet Union. His administration discussed a policy concerning a "New World 
Order," with compliance to international law as monitored by the United Nations in order 
to establish a multilateral framework for peace and stability, but nothing ever 
27 Schulz and Schulz, The United States. Honduras. and the Crisis in Central American. 55. 
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materialized,zs There was no consensus on what kind and how to enact a seriuos policy 
change, so this simply led to inaction. 
In the meantime, Central America was forgotten and moved to the bottom of the 
priority list. Defining Bush's plan for disengaging the United States from Central 
America is difficult, mainly because there was not one.29 The Bush administration 
marked a brief hiatus in foreign policies for Honduras. With the end of the cold war, 
Washington soon lost interest in Central America's strategic position in the world, 
slashing the assistance that flowed south. Relatively little attention was directed towards 
Central America. At a time when Central American leaders needed economic assistance 
more than ever, the Bush administration kicked off the 1990's with sweeping budget cuts 
in foreign aid expenditures. With cuts for Central America totaling $14.8 billion, 
Honduras received $133 million in 1990, dropping almost $50 million from 1989 [see 
also Appendix C]. 30 
After hyper-attentive relations in the 1980's, this sudden neglect of Central 
America was especially difficult for its leaders to swallow, provoking frustration and 
resentment. After receiving $1.4 billion in American assistance to host the Contras, 
Honduras in particular struggled to adjust to again being near the bottom of United States 
priorities as a region that had largely fallen from view. Moreover, the consequences of 
the destructive military tactics employed by the United States in Honduras came to 
fruition. American officials involved with Honduras in the 1980's paid little attention to 
28 Wiarda, U.S. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, 4. 
29 Arnson, Crossroads: Congress. the President. and Central America. 228. 
30 Hernandez, Silvio. "Central America: End of Embargo Raises Fears for Fragile Peace". Inter Press 
Service. Lexis Nexis Database, (12 Aug. 1997). 
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Honduras's development through the years of plenty, as long as their Contra policy was 
allowed to go forward. 
President Rafael Callejas was haunted by the dependence that the massive foreign 
aid brought. Callejas lamented about this relationship with the United States saying, "In 
reality, the majority of aid was wasted in the military field. It did nothing to help 
development. The decade ofthe 1980's was one huge step backward, economically and 
socially. It was a lost decade.,,3J 
After the militarization of Honduras scared away foreign investment, its 
superficially bloated economy created a terrible fiscal situation, as the country was 
virtually bankrupt when President Callejas took office in 1990.32 Much of the foreign 
aid received in the 1980's was cancelled out by capital flight and debt service, resulting 
in a neutral or negative net effect, especially in light of the destructive effects of the 
United States sponsored war of the contras.33 At the end ofthe Cold War, Honduras 
found itself poorer than before the billions of dollars from the United States entered the 
economy. 
Despite pleas for help from Honduras and other states in Central America, the 
United States turned a deaf ear. Former United States ambassador to Honduras, 
Cresencio Arcos said, "We never asked Honduras to do anything except to be a base for 
Contras. They were close allies ... maybe they didn't use all the money the way we 
wanted, but the place at least stayed afloat.,,34 While American involvement in Central 
31 Douglas Farah ,"Central America Feels Abandoned by Bush at a Crucial Time" The Washington Post, 
(22 Nov. 1992), 31A. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Schulz and Schulz, The United States. Honduras. and the Crisis in Central American, 1 06. 
34 Wilkinson, "A Legacy ofConfiict, Confusion," IA. 
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America in the 1980's was based on protecting an ally, the United States blatantly 
shunned helping its allies rebuild their land. 
During this period of confusion and neglect, Central American leaders deeply felt 
the absence of United States support. One Honduran political scientist summarized the 
hurt, "Honduras of the '90s is so different from the Honduras of the '80s. We no longer 
believe in the promises of North America".35 
Clinton: Socioeconomic Policy Arrives 
During 1992 election, Clinton played to the sentiments of isolationists by 
emphasizing the need to solve domestic issues. Without the rise of another superpower, 
many Americans felt justified in thinking that the United States could escape the 
problems of the world by retreating into our borders; a renewed isolationism swept the 
country. America was no longer willing to be global cop, but still wanted to retain the 
ability to pick and choose involvement in world activities. President Clinton quickly 
learned while that he might prefer to concentrate on the domestic issues that got him 
elected, events on the outside kept interfering.36 Global interdependence and the highly 
integrated world market increasingly demanded the attention of the United States. With 
such economic interdependence, the United States needed a vigorous foreign policy to 
maintain the stability, as found in sound domestic and social programs. 37 
Clinton encouraged stronger support for international organizations like the 
United Nations through a policy of "aggressive multilateralism.,,38 This encouraged 
35 Howard LaFranchi, "Rebuilding Central America," Christian Science Monitor, (12 July 1999) 1. 
36 Wiarda, U.S. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, 7. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, 10. 
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employing international forces and offices in various local conflicts, rather than 
committing United States' forces alome. The hemispherical group, the Organization of 
American States, grew more independent from the influence and control ofthe United 
States. Following a failure in Bosnia, Clinton changed this foreign policy briefly to one 
of "enlargement," then settled on flexible instruments for implementing foreign policies 
pertinent to the situation. 39 
In general, Clinton's administration focused primarily on economic policy for 
Honduras, with limited social policies announced in reaction to Hurricane Mitch in 1998. 
The major political goal was to sustain democratic rule in the region. With stagnant to 
declining levels of United States foreign aid overall [see Appendix D], Honduran foreign 
assistance from the United States declined from $51 million in 1993 to $29 million in 
1997.40 The United States planned to increase assistance for Honduras by working 
through international lenders such as the World Bank and the private sector. Despite the 
unfortunate tendency to chop foreign aid budgets, economic and political changes 
continued to transform Central America from an area with a tendency to be antagonistic 
into an important partner.41 
Several of Clinton's economic policies towards Honduras included implementing 
regional programs. Policymakers understood the need for more attention to the neighbors 
in Latin America after watching the former Soviet Union unravel, and thereby created 
potentially negative effects on the world market. Originating at the 1994 Summit of the 
Americas, the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas by the year 2005 for 
the Western Hemisphere has progressed, despite Congress withholding fast-track 
39 Ibid. 
40 "Honduras Country Notes," <http://www.state.gov/wwwibackground_noteslhonduras_l099 _ bgn.html>. 
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authority from Clinton.42 In effect, this agreement consolidates various trading alliances, 
like NAFT A, into one hemispheric union. Since the summit, the effort to unite the 
economies of the Western Hemisphere into a single free trade arrangement has been an 
ongoing fight to progressively eliminate barriers to trade and investment. 
Honduran leaders criticized Clinton for requesting greater American access to 
Central American markets without granting the weaker and smaller markets reciprocal 
benefits. So in 1998, Clinton proposed breaks for Central America in conjunction with 
NAFTA, as well as a temporary enhancement of the Caribbean Basin Initiative to lower 
tariffs for textiles and apparel produced in Central America.43 Nearly a year later, in 
November, Congress finally voted in favor of granting Central American countries many 
of the preferential treatments under the North American Free Trade Agreement.44 These 
trade enhancements hold a greater importance in Honduras' economy in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Mitch. 
Another notable event in Honduran policy was Clinton's 1997 call to end the 
embargo on advanced weapon sales to Central America. Clinton justified his policy by 
arguing that Latin American countries have largely overcome internal conflicts and retain 
a new level of maturity and dialogue, with a renewed need to modernize armed forces. 
An expert in United States relations with Central America, Julio Yao, called the removal 
41 Wiarda, U.S. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era. 133. 
42 "Overview of the FTAA Process," Free Trade of the Americas, <http://www.ftaa-
aka.org/ Aka _ e.asp#survoi>. 
43 "Regional Indicators: Central America," Energy Information Administration, 
<http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/centam.html.>, (June 1999). 
44 John Donnelly "Senate OK's bill giving Africa trade benefits; Proposal calls for reduced tariffs" The 
Boston Globe, (4 Nov. 1999), 2A. 
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of the embargo "an open provocation of Latin America peoples impoverished by 
neoliberal policies," revealing a lingering distrust of American political policy.45 
Honduras and Central America finally achieved a significant level of attention 
and aid from the United States following the violently destructive Hurricane Mitch in 
October 1998, which caused over $3 billion in damages in Honduras alone.46 The United 
States used the recovery period following Mitch to loan Honduras American technology 
and knowledge for the reconstruction period, as well as deploying thousands of Marines 
to help out. In all, the United States pledged approximately $250 million in assistance to 
help a crippled Honduras get back on its feet. 47 
Some analysts argue that the disaster relief was not simply a handout, but a 
payback for the damage the world powers caused through past ideological conflicts, such 
as the Cold War.48 Overall, the American public supported this foreign aid package for 
disaster-relief in Honduras mainly because the damage was incredible and visible. 
As a result of Hurricane Mitch, the Peace Corps created a special department 
called the Crisis Corps to bring immediate relief to Honduras, in addition to regular Peace 
Corps volunteers. This group is composed of former Peace Corps volunteers who return 
to service for short-term relief for natural disasters or humanitarian crisises.49 While the 
Crisis Corps volunteers left Honduras several months after working on reconstruction 
projects, the Corps continues to be an important foreign policy tool that focuses on 
alleviating social concerns. 
45 Silvio Hernandez, "Central America: End of Embargo Raises Fears for Fragile Peace," Inter Press 
Service. Lexis Nexis Database, (12 Aug. 1997). 
46 Howard LaFranchi, "Rebuilding Central America," Christian Science Monitor, (12 July 1999), 1. 
47 "Central America - Hurricane Mitch, Fact Sheet # 17," U.S. Agency for International Development, 
<http://www.info.usaid.govlhnlfact_sheet.html>. (19 Nov. 1998). 
48 LaFranchi, "Rebuilding Central America," 2. 
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Several months after Hurricane Mitch ravaged Honduras and Central America, 
President Clinton toured the area. In a noteworthy speech, he apologized for the past 
wrong-doings of the American government in Central America. He stated, "for the 
United States, it is important that I state clearly that the support for military forces or 
intelligence units which engaged in violent and widespread repression ... was wrong. ,,50 
In early February 2000, Director of United Sates Agency for International 
Development Brady Anderson spoke on foreign policy goals for the final year of 
Clinton's presidency. While new issues such as narcotics trade and immigration policies 
are becoming increasingly important, Anderson focused once again on the desire for 
economic access as the primary goal of United States foreign policy to Honduras. He 
stated that the continued peaceful transition to democracy in Central America would 
create more opportunities for American investment, which will benefit both the United 
Sates and Central America. 51 
Ideal Policy for the New President on Honduran Relations 
Despite remarkable economic prosperity, the United States continues to focus 
primarily on domestic issues, as shown by ranking last in percentage of gross domestic 
product given as foreign aid among major Western donors; only 1 percent of the federal 
49 "Honduras Country Notes," U. S. Department of State, 
<http://www.state.gov/wwwlbackground _ noteslhonduras _1099_ bgn.html>, (Oct. 1999). 
50 Chris Black, "Clinton Says U.S. Did Wrong in Central American Wars", CNN, 
<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9903/1 O/clinton.latam. 02/index.html>, (10 March 1999). 
51"Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic and Social Data." USAID, . 
<http://www.info.usaid.gov/regions/lac/sesdlusaid _ assistance.htrnl>, (1998). 
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budget's devoted to foreign assistance. Overall, Congress recently cut foreign aid 
programs by an average of33 percent, shrinking foreign aid to a 50-year low.52 
It is important that the United States stay actively involved in humanitarian acts 
and aid packages especially since it is the last remaining superpower. In 1997, the United 
States ranked third in development assistance, behind Japan's $9.4 billion and $6.3 
billion from France, according to recent numbers from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.53 
Japan and Europe have become increasingly generous with foreign aid for Latin 
America. It is evident that the United States cannot afford to neglect its regional 
neighbors. Ironically, after Reagan's declaration to strategically help Honduras fight 
communism, it is now in our best strategic interests to keep Honduras and Central 
America dependent on aid from the United States, not nations outside of the region. As 
the strongest leader of the Western Hemisphere, the United States must develop and 
maintain a strong relationship and support structure for Central America. 
The new President will have the opportunity to learn from two drastically 
different foreign policies over the past twenty years and to create an ideal relationship 
that is mutually beneficial to Honduras and the United States. The new administration 
can learn from American mistakes ofthe past and use history to formulate new, creative 
thoughts and ideas regarding Honduras. 
With the Cold War becoming ever distant, the new policy can focus not only on 
economic issues but also on social policies. Since the United States is secure and 
52 "How much of the Federal Budget is Spent on Foreign Aid?" Public Agenda. Lexis Nexis Database. (2 
Nov. 1998). 
53 Mary Dalrymple, "Foreign Aid Languishes In an Age ofIndifference Advocates Warn that in the post-
Cold War world, U.S. is in Danger of Losing the Peace," CO Weekly (3 July 1999), 1627. 
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confident with a large surplus of economic and military power, our leaders can pursue 
objectives that other nations would not consider. 54 In order to genuinely help Honduras 
address its problems, the root cause of problems in Honduras must be addressed. 
Honduras and the United States need to mount a united response to social issues that 
transcend politics, or else the Hondurans that most need the help will forever be short-
changed as a result of shifting governments and political situations. Unlike trade and 
national security, the problems of income inequality, poverty and inadequate access to 
education are not currently evident in United States foreign policy concerns. 55 The new 
president has the opportunity to change status quo. 
After witnessing gradual gains in social standing in recent years, the time is ripe 
for increased social policy and reform support for Honduras. From 1998 to 1999, the 
country moved up to 114th from 119th rank on the United Nation's Human Development 
Index, which measures a country's achievements in three basic dimensions of human 
development through life expectancy, education and standard of living statistics. 56 
Specific areas where the United States could help Honduras achieve better social 
standing would be through access to and reform of education and health systems. Land 
reform and income distribution policies must be adjusted to realize increased social 
equity. While Honduras tries to remedy some of these problems through public work 
initiatives, debt payment notices accounted for 21 percent of the budget in 1999, more 
than education or public health. 57 The total external debt of Honduras exceeds $4 billion, 
54 Stephen Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (MarchiApriI2000), 6. 
55 Fishlow, The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First Century View, 79. 
56 "Human Development Report," United Nations Development Program, <http://www.undp.orglhdro>, 
(1999). 
57 "Honduras Country Notes," <http://www.state.gov/wwwlbackground_noteslhonduras_1099_bgn.htm1>. 
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with revenues of only $655 million. This debt is an enormous burden on the Honduran 
economy and needs to be forgiven. 
Another important component in the Honduran-United States relationship is debt 
forgiveness. Congress recently voted in favor of easing ten of the International Monetary 
Fund's most "heavily poor indebted" countries' debts of $2 million for fiscal year 2000, 
but Honduras is not included in that liSt.58 With Honduras falling to this International 
Monetary Fund category, the new administration can focus attention on easing the debt 
burden of Honduras. 
"Trade, not aid" was a catchphrase in the 1990's, but the new administration needs 
to reexamine that philosophy. If aid is earmarked to help particular social problems, then 
the United States and Honduras together can begin to pinpoint solutions for social 
change. Before Honduras can even become a stronger trading partner, the poverty that 
affects 53 percent of the popUlation must be alleviated, or there is no room for the 
Honduran market to grow. 59 
As for economic policies, United States must continue to open its markets to 
Central America and take positions that help the region to create economic development 
through policies such as privatization or industrialization. In 1999, companies within the 
United States invested $900 million in Honduras, which equals 75 percent of all foreign 
investment in the country. 60 American investment in Honduras is expected to rise, 
especially in conjunction with the Hurricane Mitch recovery period. Congress cannot 
retreat to protectionist policies as the new millennium dawns. Despite Clinton's push for 
58 Miles Pomper, "Third World Debt Relief Plan Unveiled," CO Weekly (5 Feb. 2000). 
59 "Human Development Report," <http://www.undp.orglhdro>. 
60 "Honduras Country Notes," <http://www .state.gov/www/background _ noteslhonduras _1099_ bgn.html>. 
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opening markets in the 1990's, the American and global economy continue to be 
overwhelmingly prosperous. 
The new president must receive fast track authority for trade negotiations; a 
privilege granted every President since Nixon except Clinton, to fully implement the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas.61 This new administration must seek fast track authority for 
trade alliances from Congress at the earliest possible moment. Without this authority and 
continued delays from the United States, other Central American countries are becoming 
increasingly agitated and willing to look to other countries such as Brazil or Chile for 
leadership in this trade agreement. 62 Implementing the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
is an important building block for a liberal economic order in this hemisphere. Failure to 
pass this legislation and help out Central America will again encourage the region to tum 
to Europe or Asia for market access.63 
Also, the administration of the new president needs to recognize that United 
States can provide only limited assistance, especially when implementing goals, due in 
part to the non-committal nature of Congress relating to foreign assistance. Similar to 
Clinton's encouragement of multilateral organizations, the new president can use 
America's influence and votes in institutions such as the World Bank or Organization of 
American States to successfully achieve better relations with Central America. The 
amount of public funds available for assistance continues to dwindle in comparison to the 
private capital flow in Central America education.64 Groups like the Inter-American 
Development Bank can more easily aid in the implementation of specific educational 
61 Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy." 
62 Fishlow, The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First Century View. 180. 
63 Wiarda, U.S. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, 147. 
64 Fishlow, The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First Century View, 202. 
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policies over direct aid from the United States. However, the United States still needs to 
be actively involved in the creation of foreign policy and in the decision making 
processes of multilateral institutions. 
With continued peace in the region, the new administration does not need to 
develop a tough political policy for Honduras. After Reagan's highly military policies for 
Honduras, the country is grateful to be at peace with the United States and far away from 
America's political interests. With a small military base in Honduras, the American 
military maintains a low profile in the country. The American and Honduras militaries 
conduct joint activities in disaster relief, especially following Hurricane Mitch. The 
United States armed forces provide logistical support for medical, engineering, 
peacekeeping, and counter-narcotic activities for the benefit of Honduran people.65 
These goodwill activities help curb the lingering animosity towards the United States due 
to the detrimental military tactics in the 1980's. 
The year 2000 marks new beginnings for the century and the President of the 
United States. Ideal foreign relations with Honduras will transpire not out of economic 
gain, but more importantly, through social policies. Henry Kissinger has acknowledged 
that the United States, perhaps uniquely among nations, could not operate on the basis of 
power politics alone, that it needed moral purpose and a sense of doing right and good in 
the world to have a successful foreign policy.66 In this new millennium, let relations with 
neighboring Honduras echo Kissinger's thoughts. 
65 "Honduras Country Notes," <http://www.state.gov/wwwlbackground noteslhonduras 1099 bgn.html>. 
66 Wiarda, U.S. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, 8. --
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